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Although a number of works concerning the pre-1926 period of the Mosul Question have been produced, no exhaustive attempt has been made to investigate the post-I926 period. The primary aim of this study is to provide the historical background of the Mosul Question and to shed light on the afterınath of the Frontier Treaty of 1926. in order to obtain a fuller and truer pieture of this important issue, we emphasize the developments, which took place in the post-1926 period of the Mosul Question.
First, we examine the historical background of the Mosul Question, beginning from the Lausanne negotiations in which the fate of the Vilayet (province) became the key issue on the way to peace. Second, we investigate the period 1923-26 in whieh the inereasing tension between Britain and Turkey dominated the League of Nations negotiations. Finally, we focus on the period after the 1926 Frontier Treaty, to c1arify the payment questions of the Iraqi government's royalty revenues of ten percent to Turkey.
The Lausanne ConCerence and the Mosul Question (1922-1923)
By the end of the First World War the Ottoman Empire had been defeated and was in a state of disintegration. The Mudros Armistice, which ended the war between the Ottoman Empire and the Allies in Oetober 1918, was the final stage of this process and the Treaty of Sevres, which followed, eonfirmed it. However, the National Independenee Movement, which emerged in Anatolia from the ruins of the Empire, rejeeted the proposed peace terms and set itself up as an alternatiye government based at Ankara. it drew up the National Pact, which set out the desiderata of the Nationalists, and it won a deeisive victory over the Greeks, who invaded Anatolia in 19ı9. This military victory made a peace conference imperative and enabled the Turks to negotiate peace terms with the Allies on an equal footing. The peace treaty signed at Lausanne on 24 July ı923 finalised the Turkish peace settlement, putting an end to the centuries-old Eastem Question. ı On the eve of the Lausanne Conference, the Eastem Question, the expression used to indicate the problems created by the decline and gradual dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, had been a focal point of European and British diplomacy for over a hundred years.2 The heartland of the Ottoman Empire and Asia Minor, including Istanbul, the Straits and Turkey-in-Europe beyond the capital, had been traditionally at the core of the Eastem Question. 3 The root of the matter was the inability of the Ottoman Empire to maintain its territorial integrity. The more the economic and strategic interests of the Great Powcrs in the Empire grew and the more the ensuing rivalries became evident, the more firmly the Eastem Question became established as a priority on the agenda of international relations. Real peace and stability were further away than ever, since the decline of the Ottoman Empire opened up many possibilities of advantage to the many rival powers. Thus the Question, for a centuryand ahaif, remained the most lasting and intractable of all diplomatic issues. As Anderson argues, most of the major crises from 1856 to the outbreak of World War i in European politics were due to "a possible, a probable, or an actually threatening partition of the Ottoman territory. "4 The attempts of the Crimean War, the 1878 Congress of Berlin, and the Great War all illustrate the (New York: 1966), p.19. attempts of the different Powers to settle the Eastem Question. The Great War was but the culmination, so far as Turkey was concemed, of this long process of dissolution.
The end of the war witnessed not only the disappearance of the Ottoman Empire from the political arena, but also the emergence of Britain as the dominant power in the Middle East. Britain. as a victor with a vast amount of newly acquired territories, extended its commitments in Mesopotamia, the eastem Mediterranean, and India, all of which formed the key stones of the imperial strategic system following the war. Within this geographical area Turkey became of crucial importance to Britain as far as military, political and strategic factors were concemed. Britain could not afford to have Turkish affairs settled without its direct and active participation. Therefore, soon after the Armistice, Britain took the leading role in settling Turkish affairs. 5 The traditional British policy towards the Ottoman Empire had been to maintain the independence and integrity of the Empire. Strategic concems had been the prime motives behind the policy: the Straits, the route to India and the Persian Gulf, which Britain had long considered to be within its sphere of influence; Cyprus and the Suez Canal; and keeping Russia out of the Mediterranean to avoid a threat to Britain's eastem empire. The relations between the Ottoman Empire and Britain, which had been very close during the nineteenth century, began to cool somewhat towards the end of the century. The Ottoman Empire's participation in the First World War on the side of the Central Powers led Britain to reconsider completely its traditional policy. Britain's strategic interests in the Eastem Mediterranean could no longer be maintained by preserving and supporting the Ottoman Empire as the latter was now an enemy power. Britain consequently reversed its policyand sought the partition of the Ottoman Empire.
The Lausanne Conference was unique among post-war conferences in that it was the onlyone in which the Allies met the 5Soon after the Mudros Armistice was signed, Mosul Vilayet was illegally occupied by British troops.
defeated enemy on anything like equal terms 6 and whieh refleeted an aeeeptanee of the negotiating pasition of those whom the Allies eonsidered the defeated Ottoman Empire that had signed the Sevres treaty, but was rather a new state whieh had fought for its independenee and had not eome to Lausanne as a supplieant. The Turkish delegates' aim at Lausanne was to add a diplomatic victory to the military victory whieh had been achieved in the field. Their standpoint was the Mudanya Armistice, whereas the Western Powers tended to rely on the Annistiee of Mudros, which had been signed by the defeated Ottoman Empire.
In order to strengthen its negotiating pasition Turkey was, first of all, to rely on its military pasition. At almost every opportunity, ısmet Pasha, Head of Turkish Delegation, made it clear to the conference that he was not the representative of the defeated Otloman Empire, but of victorious Turkey, which was determined to negatiate peace on equal terms. In addition to this, Turkey went to Lausanne to seeure its prime objective: the National Paet, which eame to represent the Nationalists' requirements and formed the basis of all negotiations with the Allied powers. The Nationalists proeeeded to the Conference with a very definite programıne: the complete scrapping of the Treaty of Sevres, a plebiseite for Westem Thraee, the restoratian of Mosul, the freedam of the Straits (provided that the independenee of Turkey and the safety of Istanbul were ensured) no military restrietions, no minority provisions other than those in the European treaties, no financial and economic control, no capitulations, but the full sovereignty and independence of Turkey. In short, the National Paet in its entirety.
As for Britain, it aimed to restore its prestige in the East and in particular to ensure the freedam of the Straits; win Mosul for Iraq, whieh was under the British mandate; and drive a wedge between Ankara and Moseow. It has been argued that Curzon's (chief negotiator for Britain) handling of the Conference was a 'classical example of expert diplomacy.'7 At the outset of the Conference. Curzon, having obtained control of the procedure, secured a victory over ısmet Pasha and was now in a position to conduct the negotiations in line with his own diplomatİc strategy. He brought the questİons in which Britain was primarily interested under discussions first and until he secured British interests in a satisfactory way-that is, an international regime of the Straits under Britİsh control and retention of the rich oil regions of Mosul-the Conference would slow down and progress stalled on issues conceming other parties. The most striking example of this strategy was seen over the Mosul Question, which lay at the heart of the British claims. The British were well aware that the Question of Mosul would constitute one of the principal obstacles to the establishment of peace in the Near East.
Curzon was particularly cognizant of the fact that Mosul was going to be the crux of the conference. 8 But it was only when he realized that negotiations had reached a deadlock that he initiated his strategy to slow down the conference and make the other issues difficult to settle.
Ankara's determination for peace with England was reiterated at every opportunity, and the necessity for reconciliation bctween England and Turkey was emphasized as an invaluable asset for peace. Although they had differences of opinion over the question of Mosul. Western Thrace and the Capitulations, which were seen as a gross violation . of Turkish sovereignty, the Turkish attitude was conciliatory. Nevertheless, in spite of peaceful declarations there were also signs of extreme nervousness as to the question of Mosul. 'Mosul is Turkish and we want it back,' declared General Rcfet Pasha, a stalwart of the Natİonalist movement. Recalling the unpleasant consequences of the former British government's policy, Refet Pasha was cautious. He tried to avoid provoking the new Cabinet and adopted a conciliatory attitude.
To avoid public disagreement in the conference and embarrassment before the international community, Britain and Turkey agreed to keep the disputed points (namely Mosul) for private discussions. In the face of Ankara's demand for the restoration of Mosul to Turkey on ethnic, political, economic, historical, geographic, and military and strategic grounds, Britain was detennined to seule this issue to its advantage. The Turks claimed the Vilayet of Mosul on several occasions and insisted that it was part of Turkish territory and each time the British replied that on such a basis, no further negotiations were possible. 9 In the final stage of the negotiations, both sides managed to agree to keep the dispute out of the treaty and settle it through bilateral negotiations within nine months of the signature of the peace treaty.
The Mosul Question between 1923 and 1926
After the conference, the British position in Mesopotamia was perceived by the international community as a "colonial power" since the Iraqi-British territorial treaty had not been signed yet. It would take some time for Britain to establish its existence in Iraq and to establish a regime which would be in cooperation with it. The British, seeking to gain time, took a slow step towards the bilateral negotiations with the Turkish government. When Ankara's initiative for talks reached London it became apparent that the Foreign Office was of the opinion that the only solution lay with the League of Nations. A report by the Foreign Office emphasized that it was Britain's responsibility towards the League of Nations to rescue the Arabs from the Turkish yoke and set up an independent Iraq. They had aıready signed an agreement with King Faisal to that end. The report also stated that the Mosul Question had nothing to do with oil resources. ün 6 August 1924 Britain approached the League of Nations and asked that the Mosul Question be shelved in its political agenda. Britain put forward its economic, political, historical and strategic considerations and insisted that Iraq should retain Mosul. Ankara waged a diplomatic counter-offensive on August 25 in a note submitted to the League of Nations and emphasized that despite British intentions of dragging dow n the bilateral talks, Turkey did not oppose the dispute being referred to the League of Nations. Thus, the issue started to be discussed in the League on 20 Sept. 1924.
The dispute was shifted by Britain to the matter of fıxing the Iraqi border. However, the Turks were adamant that the question mainly concemed the fate of the 'Mosul Vilayet' rather than the border issue. The League of Nations set up an inquiry commission consisting of three members influenced by Britain. 12 Border dispute between Turkeyand Britain led to military skirmishes. In the meantime, in order to avoid the increasing tension between two sides, Turkey applied to the League of Nations on 29 üctober 1924 for a temporary border to be fixed between Turkeyand Iraq, which came to be known as 'the Brussels Line.' Britain relied on intelligence reports Considering the fact that Britain was the strongest member of the League and a permanent member of the Council and that Turkey was not even a member, it is not surprising that the commission unanimously reported that Iraq should retain Mosul and the Brussels line be made the permanent border. Turkey reluctantly had to accept the League of Nations' resolution and give up its territorial claims on the Vilayet of MosuJ, but insisted that it should have a share in the Turkish Petroleum Company. This was rejected by London on the grounds that Turkey would receive a ten percent share from the royalties of the Iraqi govemment.
Frontier Treaty and Mosul
Britain managed to bring the issue into the international arena by scaling down it to a frontier problem. Afterwards, when the League of Nations Council appointed an investigative commission that recommended that Iraq should retain Mosul, the Ankara regime reluctantly assented to the decision in "Frontier Treaty: The United Kingdom and Iraq and Turkey." By signing the Frontier Treaty in 1926 with the Iraqi govemment, the Turkish govemment made the choice of peace, supported the independent Iraq, and sought to normalize the relations with Britain. 13
The Frontier Treaty put an end to the land claims of Turkey. The frontier between Iraq and Turkey was drawn in 1926, as 'the temporary Brussels Line', which had been determined by the In the literature of Turkish political history, it is known that the Turkish government, in accordance with the exchange of letters annexed to the treaty, agreed to receiye a fıxed cash settlement of 500,000 pounds, rather than calculating the amount on a ten percent basis.16 The question is whether the government received 500,000 pounds or ten percent of the royalties, which it was supposed to receiye. In the literature, the Mosul Question has been studied until the Frontier Treaty. According to these studies, the Turkish government received the 500,000 pounds and the folio of the Mosul Question was c1osed. But some findings proved that this was not the case. Some figures in the Turkish state budgets indicate that Turkey received payments on a ten percent basis instead of the fixed cash seulement. In 1955, it was proved that the Turkish government had received some revenues from the Iraqi government on the ten percent plan. l ?
Concession Agreements and Royalties of the Iraqi Government
Governments in the Middle East receive two kinds of payments from oil companies, royalties and income taxes on profits. The royalties are usually taken in cash, though in Iraq and Iran the governments are entitled to take them in kind, meaning crude oi\. ı8 The concession was granted by the Iraqi government to the Turkish Petroleum Company, on 14 March 1925 renamed the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC).19 According to a new concession agreement during the twenty years following the completion of the pipeline to transport Iraqi oil to a port for export, 4s(gold) royalty would be paid per ton crude "saved in field storage tanks or reservoirs"; after that period, the governmentls share would be raised or lowered in the same proportion as the profits made by the company during the previous five years had increased or decreased. 2D The Iraq Petroleum Company became the major petroleum company in the region with the RedLine Agreement in Iraq. The company built the pipeline from Kirkuk 
The Beginning of Payments to Turkey
Turkish-Iraqi relations were dominated by the Mosul Question until the Frontier Treaty. Iraq was a mandate of Britain until 1930. when the Iraqi-British Treaty opened the way to an independent Iraq. The Iraqi government wanted to extend and normalize its foreign relations; Turkey was one of countries with which it sought to do so. In faet, relations far more cordial than could have been expected were maintained with the Turkish Republic. The feasible reestablishment of social contacts restored many friendships and offered mueh common ground; nor. once the seulement of 1926 was accepted loyally. was there any c1ash of interests. 24 There was a shadow of the Mosul Question on the commencement of relations between Iraq and Turkey. but not much negative influenee was observed. Turkish foreign policy was based on respecting the sovereign rights of its neighbour countries.
21With the pipeline completed in 1934, oil production increased, but not as much as the Iraqi government had anticipated. The Turkish state budget figures prove that Turkey received the royalty payments on a ten percent basis. Table 1 shows the Royalty Payments of the Iraqi Govemment and the amounts that Turkey received in the state budgets. 27 The first column shows the Jraqi govemment's royalties; the second column ten percent of the royalties; the third ten percent of the royalties in Turkish Lira; and the last two columns show the estimated and realized budget revenues of Turkish budgets to which payments were made by the lraqi govemment.
25The Saadabad Pact was signed by Iran, Iraq, Turkeyand Afghanistan and was primarily concerned with "non-intervention," the "inviolability of frontiers," "non-aggression," "consultation on international problems," "good neighbourliness relations and re~pect for the League of Nations charter and world peace. Until 1934, these payments were registered in the Turkish budgets under the heading 'extra ordinary revenues.' For this reason, the figures of 1931 and 1932 contain some other revenues. In 1934, a new account was opened in order to register the revenue under the title of 'Revenues from Mosul Petroleum'. The royalty payments to Turkey f1uctuated each year with respect to the oil production in Iraq. Table 1 shows that there is a difference between the percentages of royalty payments and the amounts pa id to Turkey. Due to a lack of data, we are unable to ascertain how the Iraqi government made the calculations for the payments. But this difference may have come from the fact that the royalties paid to the Iraqi government were gross figures and included tax commutation payments, inspection fees and scholarships to Iraqi students. 28 Change İn Concessİon Agreements and Payment Problems
In the period 1934 to 1950, the major element of revenue was tonnage royalty from the IPC's concession, paid at the rate of 4s(gold). In Iraq, the pipelines constituted a bottleneck. The construction of new pipelines was started in 1946, but owing to politica! and material difficu!ties it was not unti i i949 that the volume of oi! f10wing to the Mediterranean increased. 29 So the amounts paid to Turkey stood at a low leveL. The f10w of oil through Haifa stopped in April 1948. With the increase in domestic prices and the price of petroleum, the share of the governments in the value of the oil produced declined since pay men ts to the governments were made on a fixed basis. In Iraq, the royalty rate was increased from 4s(gold) to 6s(gold) a ton, or about 33 cent s a barrel in August 1950. 30 Royalties rose from about one million pounds in 1935 to 6.8 million pounds in 1950. This was concomitant with an increase in oil exports from 3.6 to 6.2 million tons, as well as with an increase in the value of gol d in terms of sterling. 31 The fifty-fifty method of payment was utilized 28Z. Mikdashi, A Financial Analysis of Middle East 011 Oil ColıcessiollS: 1901 -1965 (New York: Praeger, 1966), p.106. 291ssawi and Yeganeh, p. 132. 30lbid., p. 134. 31Mikdashi, p. 105. with the agreement signed in 1952. These developments increased oil production and the royalties of the Iraqi government. Table 1 shows that the ten percent royalty payments to Turkey were made regularly until 1952 by the Iraqi govemment, except the year 1945. in 1952, payments were stopped, which brought a new question regarding the determination of the starting year of the payments. The Iraqi government calculated it from i926, the Turkish govemment, from 193 ı. The Iraqi government thus ceased its payments in 1952 twenty-five years after the agreement went into force. The Turkish government protested that since the production of petroleum at Kirkuk had started only in 1931, and Turkey's share had been paid only since that date, the 25-year period should not come to an end until 1955, which had also been accepted in various bilateral agreements between Turkeyand Iraq.
Another point of contention was that after 1950,~Turkey received payments according to the previous agreement while the Iraqi government received payments according to the new agreements (1950, 1952) . Turkey wanted new arrangements with respect to the new oil agreements. In i952, one bureaucrat from the Ministry of Finance was sent to Iraq in order to find out the changes in the payments of ten percent with respect to the new concession agreement. 32 The problem was defined by the bureaucrats of both countries and a solution was found for the unpaid years. Some negotiations were took place on this subject in Ankara. But, under the new political and economic conditions of the Middle East, the Turkish government had not been taken into consideration and not received much attention on this subject.
The final payment was made in 1954 by the Iraqi govemment, but the payment was lower than it was estimated in the Turkish Budget. Iraq refused to concede to Turkey what was in fact its right and when at this time preparations started to be made for the Baghdad Pact, which was to be concluded in 1955, the Turkish government 32The Turkish bureaucrat Cahit Kayra revealed that the registration of the accounts on the Mosul payments were a mess in both countries. 
Conclusion
To sum up, the Mosul Vilayet was part of the Ottoman Empire untiI it came under the British occupation in 1918 foIIowing the First World War. Af ter the War of Independence, the new Turkish Republic considered Mosul one of the crucial issues determined in the National Pact. British foreign policy conducted according to the British economic interests in the Middle East, eventuaIIy shaped the fate of the region. Despite constant resistance, Britain managed to bring the issue into the international arena, scaling it down to a frontier problem between Turkeyand Iraq. In the Frontier Treaty of 1926, Turkey received ten percent of the Iraq i government's royalty payments for twenty-five years. From 1931 to 1952 Turkey received royalty payments regularly. There were two problems, first, the unpaid years, as noted in Table 1 , and insufficient payments regarding the caIculations of the ten percent of the royalties of the Iraqi government after the new concession agreements.
Turkey did not create an international issue about this problem. There were unpaid years, when Turkey did not receive these payments. Since then, some assertions have been made in the Turkish media that Turkey has not received its share of the Mosul petroleum, that it should receive much more payments from the share of the Iraqi governmenfs royalties. Turkey, however, has not pursued the issue in the interest of foreign policy towards its neighbouring countries and shut down the folio.
